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Abstract 
The aim of this study was to investigate if the effects of changes in physiological arousal on 
timing performance can be accurately predicted by the catastrophe model (Hardy 1990).  
Eighteen young adults (8 males, 10 females) volunteered to participate in the study following 
ethical approval.  After familiarisation, coincidence anticipation was measured using the 
Bassin Anticipation Timer under 4 incremental exercise conditions: Increasing exercise 
intensity and low cognitive anxiety, Increasing exercise intensity and high cognitive anxiety, 
decreasing exercise intensity and low cognitive anxiety, decreasing exercise intensity and 
high cognitive anxiety. Incremental exercise was performed on a treadmill at intensities of 
30%, 50% 70% and 90% heart rate reserve (HRR) respectively. Ratings of cognitive anxiety 
were taken at each intensity using the Mental Readiness Form 3 (MRF3) followed by 
performance of coincidence anticipation trials at speeds of 3 and 8 mph. Results indicated 
significant condition X intensity interactions for AE (P=.0001) and MRF cognitive anxiety 
intensity scores (P=.05). Post-hoc analysis indicated that there were no statistically 
significant differences in AE across exercise intensities in low cognitive anxiety conditions. In 
high cognitive anxiety conditions, timing performance AE was significantly poorer and 
cognitive anxiety higher at 90%HRR, compared to other exercise intensities. There was no 
difference in timing responses at 90%HRR during competitive trials irrespective of whether 
exercise intensity was increasing or decreasing. This study suggests that anticipation timing 
performance is negatively affected when physiological arousal and cognitive anxiety are 
high. 
Keywords: Exercise intensity; Bassin Anticipation Timer; Anxiety; Competition 
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Introduction 
Numerous research papers have documented the varying consequences of exercise 
intensity on cognitive, perceptual and psychomotor skills. (Davey, Thorpe, & Williams, 2002; 
Lyons, Al-Nakeeb, & Nevill, 2008; Lyons, Al-Nakeeb, & Nevill, 2006a; Al-Nakeeb & Lyons, 
2007). The findings of such studies have been equivocal with some finding that exercise 
improves performance (Lyons, et al., 2006a; Lyons, Al-Nakeeb, & Nevill, 2006b), some it 
decreases performance (Davey, et al., 2002) and some finding no effect (Lyons, et al., 2008; 
McMorris, 2000). One suggestion for the contrasting results is the failure to examine 
performance during exercise (e.g., Davey, et al., 2002; Lyons, et al., 2006a; Lyons, et al., 
2006b; Royal, et al., 2006). This anomaly has led authors (Tomporowski, 2009; Lyons, et al., 
2008) to suggest that to accurately examine the effect of exercise intensity on perceptual, 
motor or cognitive performance, the task should be completed while the participant is 
actually exercising at the intensity of interest.  
The suggestion that exercise is a physiological (Audiffren, 2009; Duncan, Smith, & 
Lyons, 2013), cognitive (McMorris, Sproule, Turner, & Hale, 2011) and psychomotor (Lyons 
et al., 2008) stressor is well established in the literature. With performance following an 
inverted U relationship, where moderate intensity exercise is associated with enhanced 
performance and higher exercise intensity is associated with poorer performance.  
More recently, Duncan et al (2013) presented data pertaining to the effect of exercise 
intensity on coincidence anticipation timing performance (CAT) which relates to the making 
of interceptive actions (Poulton, 1957) and the ability to predict and coordinate a movement 
response to the arrival of a moving object (Payne, 1986).  For example, catching a cricket 
ball or striking a moving ball in tennis (Sanders, 2011). Consequently understanding the 
effect of exercise intensity on CAT performance is of interest to psychologists, sport coaches 
and sports scientists amongst others. 
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Duncan et al (2013) reported significantly poorer coincidence timing when exercise 
was undertaken at a high intensity (90% heart rate reserve (HRR)) and stimulus speed was 
also high (8mph) compared to rest and exercise at 70% HRR. There were also no 
differences in anticipation timing scores across exercise intensity when stimulus speed was 
low (3mph). Duncan et al (2013) suggested that their results supported the Catastrophe 
Model’s predictions (Hardy, 1990). This suggestion was based on the assertion that when 
physiological arousal was high (exercise intensity of 90%HRR) and stimulus speed was 
most cognitively demanding (stimulus speed of 8mph) there was a severe reduction in timing 
accuracy. Although the study by Duncan et al (2013) provides some data relating to the 
effect of exercise intensity of timing performance, further investigation is needed as only rest, 
70% and 90%HRR were used as intensities, providing limited range of physiological arousal 
with which to compare performance across (Duncan et al 2013).  
One model that can explain how exercise may influence performance is the 
catastrophe model (Hardy & Parfitt, 1991). The model’s predictions are based on the tenet 
that there is a cognitive and physiological component that interacts with each other during 
performance. Specifically, the model predicts that when cognitive anxiety is low, the 
relationship between physiological arousal and performance should follow an inverted-U.  
Whilst when cognitive anxiety is high a hysteresis will occur and performance will follow a 
different path dependant on whether physiological arousal is increasing or decreasing 
(Jones & Hardy 1997).   
There are several researchers who have tested the predictions of the catastrophe 
model (Hardy, Beattie, & Woodman, 2007; Hardy, Woodman, & Carrington, 2004; Edwards 
& Hardy, 1996; Hardy, Parfitt, & Pates, 1994; Krane, Joyce, & Rafeld, 1994; Hardy & Parfitt, 
1991). For example, Hardy and Parfitt (1991) increased or decreased the physiological 
arousal of eight female basketball players, before attempting a basketball free throw shot.  
Decrements in performance were worst when cognitive anxiety and physiological arousal 
was at its highest, with the investigators concluding that the catastrophe model was an 
accurate predictor of how changes in physiological arousal, cognitive anxiety and somatic 
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anxiety can affect performance. There are limitations to a number of studies (Edwards & 
Hardy, 1996; Hardy & Parfitt, 1991; Hardy, Parfitt, & Pates, 1994) in that a time to event 
paradigm was used. Specifically, cognitive and somatic anxiety was measured by self-report 
(i.e. Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 (CSAI-2), Marten, Burton, Vealey, Bump, & 
Smith, 1990) prior to the performance as Hardy & Parfitt, (1991) suggest “to manipulate 
cognitive anxiety independently of physiological arousal” (p.168). While, Krane, Joyce, & 
Rafeld (1994) used the Mental Readiness Form (MRF; Murphy, Greenspan, Jowdy, & 
Tammen, 1989) at a softball tournament where participants were required to complete the 
MRF before entering the batter's box, which was as close to performance as possible 
(Krane, Joyce, & Rafeld, 1994).  We argue that a more accurate way to examine the 
catastrophe model is to measure physiological arousal and cognitive anxiety in situ.  
The aim of the present study is to examine if the effects of ‘in-event’ changes in 
physiological arousal and cognitive anxiety on task performance can be accurately predicted 
by the catastrophe model.  The study hypothesised that as a consequence of manipulating 
exercise intensity a task performance ‘catastrophe’ will occur when physiological arousal is 
high and cognitive anxiety is elevated, when compared to resting values. Secondly, the 
study hypothesised that a hysteresis effect on task performance will occur depending 
whether physiological arousal was increasing or decreasing.  
 
Methods 
Participants 
Following institutional ethics approval and informed consent, 18 physically active adults (8 
males, 10 females, mean age = 23.6 ± 4.2 years) volunteered to participate in the study. 
Participants were drawn from the institution’s sport and exercise science programme, were 
regularly engaged in competitive sport activities and reported being in health. 
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Performance Measures 
Coincidence Anticipation Timing (CAT) 
The Bassin Anticipation Timer (Model 35575, Lafayette, USA) was used to assess 
coincidence anticipation timing in the present study because it is the most widely validated 
measure of coincidence anticipation currently available (Sanders, 2011; Diggles-Buckles & 
Bassin, 1990). So that participants could complete the CAT trials whilst running, the CAT 
(2.24m in length) was set up horizontally across the front of the treadmill with the LED lights 
facing the participant. None of the lights on the runway were blanked and the target light was 
light #13. The sequentially lighted LED lamps illuminate in a linear pattern with movement 
occurring from right to left. The mean time to complete each CAT trial was 45 seconds.  
Scores were recorded in milliseconds and whether the response was early or late. The start 
and end speeds remained constant at 3 and 8 miles h-1 for all trials. Start and end speeds 
were counterbalanced within trials. To reduce the likelihood that the participant could 
internally time the trial, cue delay (visual warning system) was set as random on the timer 
with a minimum delay of 1 second and a maximum delay of 2 seconds. For each trial, the 
signal was initiated by the experimenter, with the participant being asked to press a trigger 
button, with their dominant hand, as close to the arrival time of the stimulus at the target 
location as possible.  
Heart Rate and Rating of Perceived Exertion  
Heart rate was monitored continuously throughout each experimental trial via a Polar RS400 
heart rate monitor (Polar OY, Kuopio, Finland). The Borg (1970) 6-20 rating of perceived 
exertion (RPE) scale was also used as a measure of exercise exertion during experimental 
trials. 
Cognitive Anxiety  
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Cognitive state anxiety was measured during performance by using the Mental Readiness 
Form 3 (MRF-3, Krane, 1994). The MRF-3 has three, bipolar; 11-point Likert scales that are 
anchored between worried-not worried for the cognitive anxiety scale, tense-not tense for the 
somatic anxiety scale, and confident-not confident for the self-confidence scale. The MRF-3 
is a shorter and more expedient alternative to the Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 
(CSAI-2; Martens, et al., 1990) and Krane’s validation work revealed correlations between 
the MRF-3 and the CSAI-2 subscales of .76 for cognitive anxiety, .69 for somatic anxiety and 
.68 for self- confidence (Krane, 1994).   
Procedures 
The study used a within-subjects, repeated measures design and required five visits to the 
institution’s human performance laboratory. All trials occurred at the same time of day for 
each participant to minimise any impact of circadian variation on performance.  The first visit 
comprised a familiarisation period with the CAT, where participants were given 30 attempts 
at each of the stimulus speeds used in the study (3 and 8 mph), and establishment of resting 
heart rate. Resting heart rate (HRrest) was also obtained from each participant by asking 
them to lie down in a prone position for 15 minutes whilst wearing a heart rate monitor (Polar 
RS400, Polar Electro Oy, Kempele, Finland), in a quiet room void of visual or auditory 
distractions. Maximum heart rate (HRmax) was estimated at 220 minus the participant’s age. 
Both HRrest and HRmax were then recorded and used to calculate 30%, 50% 70% and 90% 
heart rate reserve (HRR) (Karvonen, Kentala, & Mustala, 1957).  
On completion of the baseline session, participants then undertook 4 incremental 
exercise trials. These comprised two trials (increasing physiological arousal and decreasing 
physiological arousal) in two conditions; perceived competition situation (high cognitive 
anxiety) and perceived practice situation (low cognitive anxiety), necessitating 4 trials. In 
every trial participants responded to stimuli at 3mph (low cognitive load) and 8mph (high 
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cognitive load). Experimental trials were presented in a counterbalanced order and 
comprised of the following:  
• Incremental exercise increasing in intensity in a perceived competitive situation  
• Incremental exercise increasing in intensity in a perceived practice situation  
• Incremental exercise decreasing in intensity in a perceived competitive situation  
• Incremental exercise decreasing in intensity in a perceived practice situation  
In each trial, coincidence anticipation and MRF-3 scores were taken at rest and at 30%, 
50%, 70% and 90% HRR. An incremental running protocol on a motorised treadmill (HP 
Cosmos Ltd, Germany) was used to induce exercise arousal states. All trials began with a 
warm up based at 2-3mph. In trials where exercise intensity was increasing, the workload 
was then increased by 1mph every 30/60s until the participant reached the desired intensity 
as determined by 30%, 50%, 70% and 90% of heart rate reserve (HRR) (Karvonen et al., 
1957). In trials where exercise began at 90% HRR and decreased in intensity, the treadmill 
speed was increased from the warm-up speed to the 90% HRR value within a period of 
120s. The workload was then decreased by 1mph every 30/60s until the participant reached 
the desired intensity. Throughout the test procedures, heart rate was monitored using heart 
rate monitors. Borg’s (1970) rating of perceived exertion (RPE) scale was used as an 
adjunct to the monitoring of heart rate. Participants were required to achieve an RPE of 6 for 
pre-trial (rest) condition, 12-13 for the 30%HRR condition, 14-15 for the 50%HRR condition, 
16-17 for the 70%HRR condition and 18-19 for the 90%HRR exercise condition. Once the 
desired intensity was reached, as determined by both measures (%HRR and RPE) 
simultaneously, participants were then required to maintain this intensity for a further two 
minutes to ensure that participants were truly at the desired steady-state intensity. At which 
point, participants performed 10 trials on the coincidence anticipation task at a stimulus 
speed of 3 mph (Low Cognitive demand) and 8mph (High Cognitive demand) whilst still 
running. Presentation of stimulus speeds was counterbalanced.  
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The total time to complete each experimental trial was similar irrespective of whether 
exercise intensity was increasing or decreasing and comprised approximately 20 minutes of 
running, with the whole trial protocol taking approximately 30minutes per participant, per 
trial. 
Manipulation of cognitive anxiety 
To manipulate cognitive anxiety across the trials standardised instructions lasting 
approximately 1-minute were employed before the start of each experimental trial.  This 
methodology has been used in prior research as a stressor to elicit increases in cognitive 
anxiety (Barker, Jones, & Greenlees, 2010; Hardy, Parfitt, & Pates, 1994; Turner, Jones, 
Sheffield, & Cross, 2012). The statements comprised of demand appraisals in the line with 
the biopsychosocial model of challenge and threat which informed participants that the 
performance [CAT] scores indicated cognitive ability and that they would be required to 
complete 20 anticipation timing trials at each exercise intensity (10 trials at a slow and 10 
trials at a fast speed). These were considered as the high cognitive anxiety trials, in line with 
Barker et al. (2012).  Participants were also informed that two of the trials (one increasing 
exercise intensity and one decreasing exercise intensity) were considered practice trials and 
would only be used to examine the consistency of their own performance but would not be 
used further and that the other two trials were considered as competitive. These were 
considered as the low cognitive anxiety trials, in line with Barker et al. (2012). In the case of 
competitive trials, participants were told their CAT scores would be compared to all other 
participants and publically posted in ranking order, and that they would need to try very hard 
to perform well. Participants were then asked to stand for one minute before the trial began 
Statistical Analysis 
The results are expressed as mean and standard error (S.E.). For CAT scores each 
participant’s raw scores across each of the stimulus speeds were summarised into a score 
for absolute error [AE]. AE represents the absolute value of each raw score disregarding 
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whether the response was early or late and is the most commonly reported measure of 
timing error in the coincidence timing literature (Sanders, 2011). Data for CAT was analysed 
using a 2 (stimulus speed) X 4 (condition) X 5 (intensity) X 2 (gender) ways repeated 
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). Two (one for each stimulus speed), 4 (condition) X 
5 (intensity) X 2 (gender) ways repeated measures ANOVAs were then used as follow up 
tests to confirm the results from the 2 X 4 X 5 X 2 ways ANOVA. Data for MRF-3 scores was 
analysed using a 4 (condition) X 5 (intensity) X 2 (gender) repeated measures ANOVA   In 
all cases backwards elimination to achieve a parsimonious solution was employed. Where 
significant differences were found, Bonferroni post-hoc pairwise comparisons were used to 
determine where the differences lay. When Bonferroni adjustments were made an alpha 
level of P = .025 was used to account for family-wise error rate. The truncated product 
method (Zaykin, Zhivotovsky, Westfall, and Weir, 2002) was used to combine all the P 
values in this study to determine whether there was a bias from multiple comparison testing. 
The truncated product method P value was <0.0001, indicating that the results are not 
biased by multiple comparisons.  Partial eta squared (η2) was also used as a measure of 
effect size. The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS, Version 20, Chicago, Il, 
USA) was used for all analysis and statistical significance was set, a priori, at p = 0.05. 
Results 
Coincidence Anticipation timing 
Using a 2 (stimulus speed) X 4 (condition) X 5 (intensity) X 2 (gender) ways repeated 
measures ANOVA, results indicated a significant speed X condition X intensity interaction (P 
= .05, Partial η2 = .095). Data were then re analysed using two (one for each stimulus 
speed), 4 (condition) X 5 (intensity) X 2 (gender) ways repeated measures ANOVAS as 
follow up analysis. Data for Absolute Error (AE) at 3mph indicated a significant main effect 
for exercise intensity (F 4, 68 = 3.371, P= .014, Partial η2 = .165). Scores for AE were 
significantly better at 70%HRR (P = .001) compared to 90% HRR. Scores for AE at 
30%HRR (P = .014), 50%HRR (P = .005) compared to 90% HRR did not meet the alpha 
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value set for significance when considering the Bonferroni adjustment. Mean ± SE of AE 
scores across exercise intensities for each condition are presented in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 Here 
 
When the same analysis (i.e., a 4 (condition) X 5 (intensity) X 2 (gender)  repeated 
measures ANOVA) was conducted with coincidence anticipation data at a stimulus speed of 
8mph there was a significant condition X intensity interaction for AE (F 12, 192 = 3.603, P = 
.0001, Partial η2 = .184, See Figure 2). Post-Hoc analysis indicated no significant difference 
between AE in increasing intensity and decreasing intensity competition conditions (P = .08) 
or increasing and decreasing practice conditions (P = .08). AE was significantly different 
between increasing intensity, competition and increasing intensity practice conditions when 
exercise intensity was at 90% HRR (P = .001). AE was also significantly different when 
exercise intensity was at 90%HRR between decreasing intensity competition and decreasing 
intensity practice (P = .003) conditions.  Additionally, AE at 90% HRR was different between 
increasing intensity, competition and decreasing intensity, practice (P = .007) and between 
decreasing intensity, competition and increasing intensity, practice (P = .004). Only the latter 
was significant when adjusting for Bonferroni corrections. 
 
Figure 2 here 
 
MRF-3: Cognitive Anxiety Intensity 
Results from a 4 (condition) X 5 (intensity) X 2 (gender) repeated measures ANOVA 
indicated a significant condition X time interaction for cognitive anxiety (F 12, 192 = 12.778, 
12 
 
P = .002, Partial η2 = .148, See Figure 3).  Post-Hoc analysis indicated that at 30% HRR, 
cognitive anxiety scores were higher in the increasing intensity, competition condition 
compared to both the decreasing intensity, competition (P = .034) and decreasing intensity, 
practice (P = .007) conditions but did not meet the adjusted alpha value required to be 
significant when using Bonferroni adjustments.  Cognitive anxiety scores were significantly 
higher in the increasing intensity competition condition compared to the decreasing intensity 
practice (P = .002) condition at 50% HRR. There were no significant differences across 
conditions at 70% HRR (all P>.05). At an intensity of 90% HRR there were no significant 
differences between the increasing intensity, competition and decreasing intensity, 
competition (P =.261) conditions or the increasing intensity, practice and decreasing 
intensity, practice (P = .794) conditions. Cognitive anxiety scores were higher in the 
increasing intensity, competition condition compared to the increasing intensity, practice (P = 
.013) and the decreasing intensity, competition condition compared to the decreasing 
intensity, practice condition (P = .012). In these instances alpha values did not reach the 
Bonferroni adjusted level for statistical significance. There was a significant difference 
between increasing intensity competition and decreasing intensity practice conditions (P = 
.001).  
 
Figure 3 Here 
 
Discussion 
This study builds on previous work by (Edwards & Hardy, 1996; Hardy & Parfitt, 1991; 
Hardy, Parfitt, & Pates, 1994; Krane, Joyce, & Rafeld, 1994) who measured ‘pre-event’ 
anxiety rather than ‘in-event’ anxiety when investigating the catastrophe model’s predictions 
in relation to task performance. Results partially support the predictions of the catastrophe 
model in several ways. For example, when cognitive anxiety is low the effect of exercise 
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intensity on CAT performance follows an inverted-U relationship, where performance is 
poorer at rest up until 70%HHR (see Figure 1) when the CAT stimulus speed is slow (i.e. 
3mph). The change in CAT performance reported here was irrespective of practice or 
competition conditions and whether exercise intensity was increasing or decreasing. When 
the CAT stimulus speed is at 8mph, there is a significant increase in timing error (i.e., poorer 
performance) evident during high intensity exercise in the competitive trials irrespective of 
whether exercise intensity is increasing or decreasing.  
In this respect, the first hypothesis which is that a performance ‘catastrophe’ would 
occur when physiological arousal was high at the same time cognitive anxiety and somatic 
anxiety were elevated compared to resting values, is at least partially supported. It could be 
argued that the changes in CAT performance are not indicative of a ‘catastrophe’ per se, 
potentially due to the way in which cognitive anxiety was manipulated, which has been 
previously been reported as limiting factor by Hardy et al., (2007). In the current study, self-
reported cognitive anxiety was assessed and while cognitive anxiety was ‘higher’ in 
competitive conditions compared to practice conditions, the highest scores were actually 
midway on the MRF-3 scale. It is possible that the method of anxiety manipulation employed 
in the present study was not successful in creating ‘high’ anxiety in participants. Practically 
and ethically, it is difficult to create conditions where anxiety would be elevated to levels at 
the higher end of the MRF-3 scale. Prior meta-analysis by Craft, Magyar, Becker, & Feltz, 
(2003) and, Woodman, and Hardy, (2003) concluded that self-reported anxiety is not 
strongly related to performance outcomes. It may be that self-report measures in the current 
study may not be effective in accurately assessing cognitive anxiety and, hence explain the 
moderate levels of reported anxiety found in the present study. Cognitive anxiety can also be 
perceived as debilitative or facilitative (Burton 1988) to performance irrespective of how low 
or high the intensity scale is reported. Although the direction (i.e. facilitative or debilitative) of 
the anxiety response was not included in the present study it would be a useful consideration 
for future research. 
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The current study assessed cognitive anxiety during performance trials (rather than 
before performance trials) unlike the majority of prior work on this topic. Some studies have 
however attempted to assess anxiety in situ. For example, Hardy et al. (2004) who 
measured self-confidence, cognitive anxiety and somatic anxiety prior to each golfing shot. 
Despite this, the pre situ measurement, even immediately before a golfing shot as in Hardy 
et al. (2004) may not be directly comparable to the in situ measurement in the present study 
given the different physiological arousal likely to occur during high intensity aerobic exercise 
as compared to golf.  
Therefore, the results of the present study support the catastrophe model in that 
timing performance was negatively affected when physiological arousal was high (via 
manipulation of exercise intensity), and cognitive anxiety was higher than at rest (via the 
manipulation of competition/practice climate). The results of the study would seem to 
suggest that cognitive anxiety was the splitting factor in whether there was a ‘catastrophic’ 
failure in performance but only when the performance task was more cognitively demanding 
(via a higher stimulus speed on the anticipation timer). Such data aligns with prior assertions 
by Hardy and Parfitt (1991) and Krane et al (1994). Likewise, when the less cognitively 
demanding stimulus speed was considered the results support claims made by McMorris et 
al (2011) that there is an inverted-U relationship between exercise intensity and 
performance. In addition, a major prediction of the catastrophe model is that when cognitive 
anxiety is high, performance will follow a different path depending whether physiological 
arousal is decreasing or increasing, which has been termed ‘hysteresis’ (Hardy, 1990).  The 
present study also hypothesised that a hysteresis effect would be evident where timing 
performance would differ depending whether physiological arousal was increasing or 
decreasing. There was no evidence of hysteresis effects in the present study and as such 
this aforementioned hypothesis was not supported. The lack of hysteresis effect in the 
present study may be due to a number of factors including the use of increasing and 
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decreasing (i.e. physiological arousal and cognitive anxiety) trials on different days and the 
reduction in cumulative fatigue which would accompany such protocols.  
Moreover, to the authors’ knowledge and based on the ‘in situ’ nature of the method, 
the current study is an improvement on previous investigations of the catastrophe model to 
date, and consequently one which adds to the extant literature in the area. Although the 
catastrophe model has shown promise in explaining the relational effect of anxiety on 
performance (Hardy & Parfitt, 1991), due to the difficulty in testing the predictions of the 
model, very few studies have been completed in the last 25 years. We add to the previous 
literature in the area by testing anxiety ‘in-event’ and prior to performance during exercise. 
Therefore, although the results of the present study add support to the catastrophe model 
and prior research in the area (Hardy & Parfitt, 1991; Krane et al., 1994), the use of an ‘in-
event’ task in the present study extends the topic area in a way which has previously not 
been forthcoming. We also acknowledge that the method used in the present study differs 
from previous studies of the catastrophe model as the increasing and decreasing exercise 
intensity conditions were conducted on different days. This method is unlike other studies 
(e.g., Hardy & Parfitt, 1991) that used protocols that increase and then decrease in arousal 
during the same experimental session. From the context of exercise induced physiological 
arousal such protocols are problematic. The process of increasing exercise intensity and 
then immediately decreasing exercise intensity may not solely represent decreasing exercise 
induced physiological arousal but rather will include a cumulative fatigue aspect from the 
previous increases in exercise intensity. The protocol employed in the present study 
removes the possibility that cumulative fatigue from an increasing exercise induced arousal 
condition would impact on performance in the decreasing exercise induced arousal 
condition.  
The results of the present study are novel as physiological arousal and cognitive 
anxiety was assessed ‘in situ’ alongside a measure of performance. In this respect, the 
results suggest that cognitive anxiety was significantly higher (compared to rest) during high 
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intensity exercise (90%HRR) during both the competitive performance conditions compared 
to the practice performance conditions, which addresses key criticisms of past research 
study design, namely the assessment of performance during exercise, rather than on 
exercise cessation (Tomporowski, 2009; Lyons, et al., 2008).  
Despite the findings presented here, the present study does have some limitations. 
By assessing CAT during exercise we sought to build on prior recommendations (Lyons et 
al., 2008) that CAT should be assessed at different stimulus speeds and during rather than 
post exercise. In addition, allocation of treatment could not be completely blinded from 
participants as they were explicitly informed which trials were competition and practice trials 
and the nature of exercise in terms of increasing or decreasing exercise intensity was 
evident from the outset of each trial. Furthermore, only state anxiety was assessed in the 
present study. It could be argued that assessment of trait anxiety would also have added to 
the current study. For example, processing efficiency theory (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992) 
predicts that state anxiety experienced by a performer is determined interactively by trait 
anxiety and the perceived threat in the performance setting, which was supported in a study 
by Hardy and his colleagues, who used trait anxiety quite successfully to manipulate state 
anxiety (Hardy et al. 2007). 
 Thus, in the context of the present study understanding how trait anxiety may have 
interacted with the perception of competition or practice may have provided valuable insight 
into the mechanisms by which performance catastrophes are derived. Future researchers 
should therefore consider the inclusion of both state and trait measures of anxiety in their 
designs.   Finally, only cognitive anxiety was manipulated in the current study. Future 
research which also manipulated somatic anxiety and self-confidence would be 
desirable in developing scientific understanding of the catastrophe model. The time 
and labour intense nature of such a study prohibited the manipulation of somatic 
anxiety and self-confidence alongside the manipulation of cognitive anxiety and 
exercise induced arousal in the present research.  
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Conclusions 
The current study suggests that CAT performance is negatively affected when 
physiological arousal is high and cognitive anxiety is increased from resting values. Such 
effects are not seen when cognitive anxiety is lower, thus cognitive anxiety may be 
considered the decisive factor in predicting decrements in performance.  Furthermore, it is 
the participant’s perception of competition over practice that is a major influencing factor in 
increasing cognitive and somatic anxiety. Consequently, these results strongly support the 
predictions of the catastrophe model. 
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